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JOE CAMEL: WILL "OLD JOE" SURVIVE?
Justice Brandeis once wrote: "Experience should teach us to
be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's
purposes are beneficent.... The greatest dangers to liberty lurk
in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but
without understanding."'
Cigarette advertisements featuring a "sunglass-sporting, phal-
lic-nosed,"2 camel named Joe, surrounded by his "cool, jazz-play-
ing, pool-hustling, poker-playing, cigarette-smoking"' crowd of
camel-friends, have been accused of enticing children to smoke.
In 1991, the nation's top two health officials, Secretary of Health
and Human Services Louis W. Sullivan and Surgeon General
Antonia C. Novello, battled with tobacco companies over the use
of cartoon characters to advertise cigarettes.4 Since then, twen-
ty-seven state attorneys general have petitioned the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) to sue R.J. Reynolds (RJR) to ban Joe
Camel advertisements.' While she was Surgeon General,
Jocelyn Elders attacked cigarette advertising "that she said...
appealed directly to young people, especially RJR Nabisco's pop-
ular 'Joe Camel' character."6
Public interest advocates want Joe Camel banned because
they claim the advertisements target children and adolescents in
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. Tobacco War Is Puff Away: Traders Think Smokers' Loyalty to High-Priced
Brand Cigarettes, Past Profits Are Fading Fast, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 16, 1993, at
A15 [hereinafter Tobacco War].
3. Daniel Mendel-Black, Leader of the (Cigarette) Pack, Me and That Camel Ad:
The Seduction of America's Youth, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 1991, at C5.
4. Paul Farhi, Kool's Penguin Draws Health Officials' Heat: Surgeon General,
HHS Claim Ad Campaign Is Aimed at Minors, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1991, at C1.
Novello said, "The use of themes in tobacco advertising that appeal to young people
is disgraceful." Id. Sullivan stated, "Cartoon figures can't hide the truth: Smoking is
the No. 1 preventable cause of death in America." Id.
5. Paul Farhi, Push To Ban Joe Camel May Run Out of Breath, WASH. POST,
Dec. 4, 1993, at C1.
6. John Schwartz, Report Cites Teenagers' Tobacco Use: Rise in Smoking Noted by
Surgeon General, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1994, at Al, A18.
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an effort to sell cigarettes.7 Tobacco companies refute this accu-
sation, arguing that Joe Camel is aimed at smokers of legal age
in an effort to maintain brand loyalty or encourage brand
switching.8 Initially, the FTC had been reluctant to enter this
controversy because of the constitutional questions involved. In
addition, the FTC has been struggling with Congress to define
its role and authority to regulate advertising and protect con-
sumers. A decision regarding a ban of Joe Camel advertisements
came at a critical time in this debate. Despite pressure to insti-
tute a ban, on May 31, 1994, the FTC, by a three-to-two vote,
decided not to take any action against Joe Camel.9 Accordingly,
the FTC does not pose a current threat to Mr. Camel. Neverthe-
less, with the increasing pressure on. the cigarette industry, a
renewed assault on Joe Camel by Congress, the courts, other
administrative agencies, or future FTC commissioners is likely.
The Joe Camel advertisements qualify as commercial speech
under the First Amendment. 1° In the 1993-94 Term, the Su-
preme Court decided three commercial speech cases in an effort
to clarify the commercial-speech doctrine." This Note examines
these three cases and their effect on the commercial speech
doctrine. Analyzing these cases and the Court's approach when
children are involved, this Note attempts to determine the stan-
dard the Court should use to decide whether a ban on Joe Camel
advertisements would violate the First Amendment. Next, this
Note discusses the FTC's authority to regulate commercial
speech and the First Amendment issues implicated by such
regulation. This Note will comment on the FTC's decision not to
ban Joe Camel advertisements in light of these First
Amendment concerns. Finally, this Note will address the future
alternatives available to opponents of Joe Camel and the likeli-
hood that banning Joe Camel would be successful.
7. U.S. Urged To Escalate Tobacco War, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1994, at A17.
8. Susan Cohen, Smooth Sell, WASH. POST MAG., Feb. 20, 1994, at 8, 12.
9. Camel Ad Gets a Reprieve from the FTC, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 1994, at D3.
10. See infra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 163-211 and accompanying text.
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THE EFFECTS OF CIGARETTE ADVERTISING
From the 1950s to the late 1980s, the "Marlboro Man" made
Marlboro cigarettes the most successfully marketed cigarette in
the United States.12 In 1988, however, RJR launched a $75 mil-
lion-a-year advertising campaign to sell its Camel cigarettes. 3
The advertisements featured "smooth" cartoon character Joe
Camel."
Joe Camel has been a highly effective advertising campaign.
Before "Old Joe," Marlboro held nearly thirty percent of the $44
billion American cigarette market, but, today, Marlboro's overall
market share has dropped to twenty-two percent." Camel, for-
merly a bottom-rank brand, is now one of the country's top sell-
ing brands. 6
Camel's market share has increased, but overall cigarette
sales have decreased.' In the United States, the number of
smokers has declined steadily by one million each year." This
decrease is predominantly due to education about the negative
health effects of smoking. 9 In addition to this decline, some
surveys show that from 1988 to 1990, no real growth in teenage
smoking occurred," and, in 1993, only nineteen percent of high
12. Tobacco War, supra note 2, at A15.
13. Id.
14. Mendel-Black, supra note 3, at C5.
15. Tobacco War, supra note 2, at A15. Marlboro, however, remains the most
popular cigarette among teens. See Teens Drawn In by Cigarette Ads, Study Finds,
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 19, 1994, § 1, at 5 (accounting for 60% of teen sales in 1993) [here-
inafter Teens Drawn In].
16. Teens Drawn In, supra note 15, at 5 (reporting an increase to almost 14% in
Camel's market share).
17. Joseph R. DiFranza et al., RJR Nabisco's Cartoon Camel Promotes Camel
Cigarettes to Children, 266 JAMA 3149 (1991).
18. Id.
19. Gary Lee, On Both Sides of the Leaf U.S. Condemns Tobacco, Subsidizes
Sales, WASH. POST, June 4, 1992, at A27. In 1991, the federal government spent $80
million dollars in its campaign against tobacco use. Id. A recent study conducted by
the University of California at San Francisco found that television commercials de-
picting tobacco companies as greedy and uncaring increased threefold the number of
smokers who quit or cut back, while a similar study in Minnesota concluded that
"long-term community-wide education campaigns that include intensive anti-smoking
programs can lower 'the risk of being a smoker' among teens by 40 percent." Don
Oldenburg, Tobacco's Last Gasp?: Toward a Smoke-Free Society, WASH. POST, Feb.
23, 1993, at C5.
20. Compare NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY
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school seniors smoked daily compared to twenty-seven percent in
1975.21 More recent surveys, however, show a small in-
crease-seventeen percent to nineteen percent-in smoking
among high-school-aged children since 1992.22 An increase of
this size does not correlate with the significant increase in the
amount of money the tobacco industry has spent on advertising
allegedly targeted at young people. The amount of money spent
on advertising and promotion increased from $2.5 billion in
198523 to $4.6 billion in 1994.24
JOE CAMEL: DOES HE ENTICE CHILDREN TO SMOKE?
With the decrease in the number of adult smokers in the
United States, many opponents of Joe Camel argue that the only
way for cigarette companies to remain profitable is to entice
young people to try cigarettes in the hope that they will continue
smoking throughout adulthood. 25 Evidence to support this the-
ory focuses on the increase in young smokers choosing Camel
cigarettes since Joe Camel was introduced into the marketplace.
In 1992, Camel was the cigarette chosen by thirty-three percent
of America's underage smokers, up from 0.5 percent three years
earlier.26 Its market share among eighteen to twenty-four year-
olds has almost doubled since the campaign started in 1988.27
ON DRUG ABUSE: MAIN FINDINGS 1990 with NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE,
NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE: MAIN FINDINGS 1988. The surveys
also showed a decline in the number of twelve and thirteen year-olds who had
smoked within one month of the survey to two percent in 1990. Id.
21. Cohen, supra note 8, at 10.
22. Id. at 23; see also Jeremy Wallace, Institute of Medicine Battles Teenage Smok-
ing, DET. FREE PRESS, Sept. 14, 1994, at 5A (discussing a recent report by the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences citing recent studies that show that smoking among
youths has remained at a constant level and may have increased slightly).
23. Cohen, supra note 8, at 11.
24. Teens Drawn In, supra note 15, at 5.
25. Henry A. Waxman, Tobacco Marketing: Profiteering from Children, 266 JAMA
3185 (1991). "To maintain sales, the tobacco industry must rely on more than 1,000
children each day becoming addicted to tobacco." Jay Siwek, M.D., The Silent Epi-
demic, WASH. POST, June 23, 1992, (Health), at 15.
26. John Rosemond, Banning Joe Won't Lessen Tobacco's Lure, PHOENIX GAZETTE,
Apr. 9, 1992, at El.
27. Stuart Auerbach, FTC Staff Takes Aim at 'Joe Camel'. Reynolds Denies Ad
Campaign Is Aimed at Enticing Teens To Smoke, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1993, at D9.
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In 1991, the Journal of the American Medical Association
(JAMA) published a series of studies suggesting that cigarette
advertisements using cartoon characters have a greater appeal
to children and adolescents than to adults. One study showed
that children between the ages of three and six identify Joe
Camel as readily as Mickey Mouse.28 Another study found that
seventy percent of adolescents between the ages of twelve and
seventeen identified Camel and Marlboro as the most heavily
advertised brands.29 The study also found that the younger the
individual, the more likely that the teenager would identify
Camel as the most heavily advertised cigarette brand.0 The
third study found that high school students were more likely to
recognize Joe Camel and link his image to cigarette's than were
a group of adults."'
These studies provide much of the evidence used to assert
that cigarette advertisements featuring Joe Camel target adoles-
cents. The effect of cigarette advertising, however, is difficult to
assess due to the possible factors contributing to smoking behav-
ior, the methodological problems in the existing studies, and the
strong disagreement among researchers about the validity of the
studies.32 RJR has also attacked the authority of the JAMA
studies. Specifically, the company alleges that one author, Dr.
Joseph R. DiFranza, altered the questions and lumped together
data to produce the most damaging results.3 RJR uncovered a
28. Paul M. Fischer et al., Brand Logo Recognition by Children Aged 3 to 6 Years:
Mickey Mouse and Old Joe the Camel, 266 JAMA -3145 (1991).
29. John P. Pierce et al., Does Tobacco Advertising Target Young People To Start
Smoking?, 266 JAMA 3154 (1991). The purpose of the study was to "evaluate
whether tobacco advertising encourages teenagers younger than 18 years to start
smoking." Id. The study compared 1990 California telephone survey data with data
from a 1986 telephone survey. Id.
30. Id.
31. DiFranza et al., supra note 17, at 3150-51 (determining if children see, re-
member, and are influenced by cigarette advertising).
32. Lawrence 0. Gostin & Allan M. Brandt, Criteria for Evaluating a Ban on the
Advertisement of Cigarettes: Balancing Public Health Benefits with Constitutional
Burdens, 269 JAMA 904 (1993). "Existing studies do not adequately account for the
full range of possible variables that can affect smoking . . . ." Id. at 906.
33. Maria Mallory, That's One Angry Camel, Bus. WK., Mar. 7, 1994, at 94. RJt's
attorneys uncovered this evidence in documents subpoenaed for discovery purposes.
Id. DiFranza dismissed the allegations as another tactic by the tobacco companies to
mislead the public. Id. at 95; see also Cohen, supra note 8, at 12 (reporting that
1995] 1523
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letter to DiFranza's co-researchers in which DiFranza wrote that
"responses to some questions appeared to show the Camel ad-
vertisements appeal more to people in their twenties than in
their early teens."34 Although Dr. DiFranza denies these allega-
tions," a significant number of studies cast doubt on his find-
ings.3" For example, in February of 1994, an RJR-commissioned
Roper poll found that "90 percent of kids aged 10 to 17 recog-
nized such ad icons as the Energizer Bunny and the Keebler
elves" but only "73 percent recognized Joe [Camel].""' "Just 3
percent of the kids who knew Joe said they liked cigarettes or
that smoking was O.K. A majority said smoking was 'gross' or
bad for their health."
38
With no incontrovertible evidence that Joe Camel advertise-
ments cause children to smoke, RJR has aggressively challenged
efforts to ban Joe Camel. The cigarette maker has also taken
steps to demonstrate that it is not attempting to lure children to
smoke. For example, RJR recently hired a well-known actor to
star in public-service advertisements to discourage underage
smoking.39 Moreover, the company maintains its strong in-
house ad-review panel to ensure that all advertisements featur-
ing Joe Camel, and marketing ventures using Joe Camel, do not
suggest that RJR is pushing cigarettes on children." Although
these efforts are just beginning, they bolster RJR's contention
that it is not targeting children with its advertising campaign
but instead is encouraging brand switching among adult smok-
ers. Nonetheless, without conclusive evidence that Joe Camel
DiFranza denied manipulating his data and stood behind other findings from the
study).
34. Mallory, supra note 33, at 95.
35. Cohen, supra note 8, at 12.
36. See generally id. (noting a study by John Pierce, a researcher at the Univer-
sity of California at San Diego, who found that, in 1988, smoking among sixteen- to
eighteen-year-old Californians "reached an all-time low ... but then suddenly re-
versed, increasing by 0.7 percent annually in the first years of the Joe Camel cam-
paign"). Compare a survey for Advertising Age in 1992 which put Camel's share of
the underage smoking market at eight percent or in fifth place among young people.
See id.
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advertisements are not aimed at children and do not cause them
to smoke cigarettes, this debate will continue.
How THE GOVERNMENT BANNED CIGARETTE ADVERTISEMENTS
Banning Joe Camel cigarette advertisements would not consti-
tute the first instance of cigarette advertisement regulation.
Most notably, television and radio advertisements for cigarettes
have not existed since Congress passed The Public Health Ciga-
rette Smoking Act of 1969.41 However, the events leading to
passage of this law were somewhat unusual.
In a 1964 report, the Surgeon General warned that cigarettes
were "a health hazard of sufficient importance ... to warrant
appropriate remedial action,"42 and the government responded
almost immediately. The FTC proposed that cigarette advertise-
ments carry a printed warning, and Congress enacted a law re-
quiring cigarette packages to carry the warning "Caution: Ciga-
rette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health."43 In ex-
change for this warning, Congress gave the tobacco industry a
three year reprieve from FTC, Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC), state, and local regulation.44
Three years later, when the ban on federal regulation of the
tobacco industry was about to expire, the FCC instituted a policy
requiring broadcasters to air one anti-smoking commercial for
every four cigarette commercials.45 By 1969, the tobacco compa-
41. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 6, 84
Stat. 87, 89 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1988)) (banning cigarette
advertisements on all "medium of electronic communication[s]" beginning January 1,
1971).
42. David D. Vestal, The Tobacco Advertising Debate: A First Amendment Perspec-
tive, in ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH 127, 128 (Theodore R. Kupferman ed.,
1990).
43. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79
Stat. 282, 283 (1965) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (1988)).
44. Sylvia A. Law, Addiction, Autonomy, and Advertising, 77 IOWA L. REV. 909,
914 (1992) (quoting the 1964 report).
45. Id. This policy was formed in response to the actions of an anti-smoking activ-
ist, John Banzhaf, who appealed to the FCC to ban cigarette advertising in the elec-
tronic media. Id. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld this poli-
cy. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (upholding, under the fair-
ness doctrine, the FCC requirement that broadcasters air anti-smoking advertise-
ments), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
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nies readily agreed to a ban of all cigarette advertising on televi-
sion and radio because of the negative effects anti-smoking ad-
vertisements had on cigarette sales.46 Congress obliged and
passed a law to that effect.47
Over the next fourteen years, Congress strengthened the
warning labels on cigarette packages" and forced tobacco com-
panies to include the labels on all cigarette advertisements.49
Other than federal warning guidelines, however, "no state or
federal law restricts advertisement of cigarettes in the print me-
dia."5 In fact, Congress has preempted all state regulation of
cigarette advertising.51
In recent years, public sentiment has favored restrictions on
cigarette smoking.2 Recent legislation prohibits smoking on
almost all domestic airline flights,53 and hundreds of retail op-
erations and shopping centers around the country, including
Sears and Arby's, 4 have voluntarily banned smoking. The En-
vironmental Protection Agency in 1993 labeled passive-smoking
"'as serious a carcinogenic risk as asbestos and radon,"'55 and
ninety-six percent of recently surveyed office and plant manag-
46. Vestal, supra note 42, at 129 n.12.
47. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act § 6, 84 Stat. at 89 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1988)). Broadcasters challenged this ban but were dismissed by
memorandum opinion in Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582
(D.D.C. 1971), affd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000
(1972). Because the broadcasters who filed suit had not lost any right to speech but
had only "lost an ability to collect revenue from others for broadcasting their com-
mercial messages," the Court did not rule on the issue of First Amendment protec-
tion for a ban on cigarette advertising. Id. at 584.
48. See, e.g., The Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
474, § 4(a), 98 Stat. 2000, 2201-02 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)
(1988)).
49. Id.
50. Law, supra note 44, at 915.
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988) (stating that "[n]o requirement or prohibition based
on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the adver-
tising or promotion of any cigarettes").
52. Vestal, supra note 42, at 128.
53. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-164, § 335, 103 Stat. 1069, 1098-99 (codified as amended at
49 U.S.C. § 1374(d)(2)(A) (Supp. 1992)).
54. Kirstin D. Grimsley, More Malls, Stores Curb Smoking, WASH. POST, Jan. 26,
1994, at Al.
55. See Oldenburg, supra note 19, at C5 (quoting the EPA report).
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ers said they expect smoke-free workplaces by the year 2002.56
Smoking also has been prohibited in the White House, four
major league baseball parks, and Colonial Williamsburg and was
banned at the 1992 Summer Olympics.57
Capitol Hill and the White House have responded to this
change in public sentiment. President Clinton previously inti-
mated that he would propose a federal tax on cigarettes to fund
health-care reforms,58 and bills to regulate cigarette advertising
have gained substantial support and expanded in number. 9
"'Members of Congress are... uncomfortable supporting tobacco
interests anymore."'60 This increasing support for efforts to re-
strict cigarette smoking and advertising suggests that a ban on
Joe Camel advertisements would be challenged not in Congress
but in the courts on constitutional grounds.
ARE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES MORE EASILY OVERCOME
WHEN CHILDREN ARE INVOLVED?
The primary reason for banning Joe Camel advertisements is
the deleterious effect they may have on children by encouraging
them to smoke cigarettes. In analyzing the constitutionality of
such a ban, it is necessary to examine the circumstances in
which the United States Supreme Court is willing to limit con-
stitutional guarantees in order to protect children. The Court
has recognized a "compelling interest in protecting the physical
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Kentuckians Burn First Lady in Effigy, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1994, at A2;
see also Dana Priest & Michael Weisskopf, Health Care Reform: The Collapse of a
Quest, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1994, at A6; Dana Priest, Some Hope Seen for Small
Health Bill, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1994, at A4.
59. H.R. 2147, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., (1993) (regulating the manufacture, labelling,
advertising and promotion of tobacco products); H.R. 1969 and S. 609, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess., (1993) (removing the tax deduction for advertisements promoting ciga-
rettes); H.R. 1966, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (requiring that cigarette packages
and cigarette advertising bear a label stating the addictive quality of nicotine); H.R.
3297, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1990) (banning glamorous cigarette advertisements from
publications targeted at readers under 21 years of age); H.R. 1493, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989) (restricting the advertising and promotion of tobacco products); H.R.
1272, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3(a), 4(2)(D) (1987) (proposing a ban on all cigarette
advertising); H.R. 4972, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 3(a), 5(2)(D), 7 (1986) (same).
60. Cohen, supra note 8, at 28 (quoting Congressman Synar).
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and psychological well-being of minors."61 "[Alithough children
generally are protected by the same constitutional guarantees
against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is
entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children's vul-
nerability and their needs for 'concern,... sympathy, and...
paternal attention."'62
With this overriding concern, the Court has upheld restric-
tions on the First Amendment rights of children. In Prince v.
Massachusetts,63 the Court recognized that the "state's authori-
ty over children's activities is broader than over like actions of
adults."' By sustaining child labor laws that prohibited a nine-
year-old girl from selling religious materials on the street,65 the
Court acknowledged "the interests of society to protect the wel-
fare of children"66 and to give them "opportunities for growth
into free and independent well-developed men and citizens."67
The Court upheld this statute despite the fact that it
"[c]oncededly... would be invalid," if made applicable to
adults.6"
Ginsberg v. New York69 further illustrates the Court's con-
cern for a child's inability to make mature decisions. At issue
was a law prohibiting the sale of sexually oriented magazines to
minors under the age of seventeen.7 ° Although the First
Amendment protected the sale of the magazine to adults,71 the
Court held that the availability of the magazines to children
presented a danger against which they should be protected.72
.. [T]he power of the state to control the conduct of children
reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults and,' ac-
61. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
62. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971)).
63. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
64. Id. at 168.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 165.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 167.
69. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
70. Id. at 631.
71. Id. at 634.
72. Id. at 641.
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cordingly [we] acknowledge a supervening state interest in the
regulation of literature sold to children."' 3
More recently, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,4 a divided
Court upheld the power of the FCC to regulate speech over the
radio if the speech is "indecent" even though it is not constitu-
tionally obscene. 5 The holding was narrow, relying on the
"unique" aspects of broadcasting such as accessibility to mi-
nors. 6 The radio broadcast at issue involved a monologue in
which comedian George Carlin discussed seven "dirty words."
Pacifica broadcast the program in the early afternoon when, the
Court assumed, children were likely to be listening. 8 A majori-
ty of the Justices held that the FCC cannot censor material be-
fore it is broadcast, but it can review and sanction a broadcast
based on its content. 9 A different majority of the Justices ruled
that broadcasting receives limited protection from the First
Amendment because it is "a uniquely pervasive presence in the
lives of all Americans""0 and "is uniquely accessible to children,
even those too young to read."8 ' However, beyond these
grounds, no majority could agree on the constitutional rationale
for the holding. Justices Stevens and Rehnquist and Chief Jus-
tice Burger suggested that in determining the constitutional
protection afforded speech, courts must consider the content and
context of the broadcast." Justices Powell and Blackmun re-
jected this view and held that society's right to protect children
from the "general dissemination of such speech" 3 combined
with the unique characteristics of the broadcast media permitted
73. Id. at 638 n.6 (quoting Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the
First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 938-39 (1963)).
74. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
75. Id. at 737-38.
76. Id. at 749-50.
77. Id. at 729.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 735.
80. Id. at 748.
81. Id. at 749.
82. See id. at 747-48 ("Because content of that character is not entitled to abso-
lute constitutional protection under all circumstances, we must consider its context
in order to determine whether the Commission's action was constitutionally permissi-
ble.").
83. Id. at 758.
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regulation of the monologue.' Justices Stewart and White dis-
sented on statutory grounds and never reached the constitution-
al issues.8 5 Justices Brennan and Marshall strongly dissented,
finding that no fundamental privacy interest was implicated"
and that parental choice determined whether a child should lis-
ten to such a broadcast. 7 Although a narrow holding by a di-
vided Court, Pacifica suggests that protection of children is an
acceptable rationale for regulating speech and limiting certain
First Amendment rights.
The Court has explicitly recognized that a restriction promul-
gated to protect children must be narrowly tailored so as not to
impermissibly infringe upon the rights of adults. In Butler v.
Michigan," a unanimous Court struck down a statute that
made it an offense to provide materials to the general public
that may have a detrimental influence on minors.89 The state
argued that its compelling interest was to "shield juvenile inno-
cence" and "promote the general welfare."" The Court, howev-
er, found the statute to be overbroad and vague because such re-
strictions "reduce the adult population.., to reading only what
is fit for children."9 That the purpose of the law was to protect
children did not validate the statute.2
In Sable Communications v. FCC,93 the Court recognized the
compelling interest of protecting minors from exposure to inde-
cent telephone messages.94 The Court, however, invalidated the
statute because it limited "the content of adult telephone conver-
sations to that which is suitable for children to hear."95 In other
words, Congress could impose a total ban of "obscene" telephone
84. Id. at 759-60 (discussing the intrusive nature of radio).
85. Id. at 778-79.
86. Id. at 765.
87. Id. at 770.
88. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
89. Id. at 383-84.
90. Id. at 383.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
94. Id. at 126.
95. Id. at 131.
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messages because obscenity is not protected speech,96 or Con-
gress could regulate non-obscene, "indecent" dial-a-porn if it
narrowly tailored the restriction to protect minors. 7 A total ban
of "indecent" telephone messages, however, is not narrowly tai-
lored because it would act to restrict protected speech among
adults."8
The government cannot prevent the general public from read-
ing or having access to materials solely on the ground that the
materials would be objectionable if read or seen by children.9
Such a ban is precisely what proponents of the ban on Joe Cam-
el advocate. They assert that Joe Camel is objectionable if seen
by children and want the government to prohibit RJR from em-
ploying the figure in its advertisements. Although such a ban
may arguably serve the compelling interest of protecting chil-
dren, it would not be narrowly tailored. Consequently, it would
"reduce the adult population ... to reading only what is fit for
children.""1 '
THE HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Joe Camel advertisements qualify as commercial speech, and
discussing the constitutional validity of a ban on these advertise-
ments requires analysis under the commercial speech doctrine of
the First Amendment. In 1942, the Supreme Court took the first
step towards defining commercial speech and the extent to
which commercial speech could be regulated consistently with
the First Amendment.' In Valentine v. Chrestensen,°2 the
Supreme Court held that, although speech cannot be unduly
burdened, commercial speech does not enjoy a high level of pro-
tection."0 3 Although the First Amendment forbids banning all
communication by handbill, the Constitution "imposes no such
restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertis-
96. Id. at 124.
97. Id. at 126.
98. Id. at 131.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 61-98.
100. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
101. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 54.
1995] 1531
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1519
ing."0 4 The Court accorded great deference to the legislature in
determining how commercial speech could be proscribed in order
to protect the public interest.0 5
After Chrestensen, the commercial-speech doctrine slowly
evolved, inching farther away from unlimited government-regu-
latory power and toward express, First Amendment protection.
In a 1951 case, Breard v. Alexandria,0 6 the Court acknowl-
edged the competing interests present in commercial speech
cases." 7 By weighing a homeowner's right to privacy against a
publisher's right to solicit door-to-door, the Court acknowledged
that the commercial aspect of speech does not necessarily elimi-
nate constitutional guarantees of freedom.'
The first hint of disapproval of the Chrestensen decision ap-
peared in a concurring opinion by Justice Douglas in 1958.09
In Cammarano v. United States,"' Justice Douglas criticized
Chrestensen and argued that a "profit motive should make no
difference""' to the First Amendment analysis. Justice
Douglas' opinion was the Court's first step in attempting to
identify the factors that should be considered in an analysis of
commercial speech."2
In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations,"' the Court progressed in defining commercial
speech when it identified an advertisement that did "no more
than propose a commercial transaction" as the "classic example[]
of commercial speech.""4 The Court upheld an ordinance pro-
hibiting newspapers from listing employment advertisements in
columns according to whether the advertisements sought to hire
104. Id.
105. Id. at 55.
106. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring).
110. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
111. Id. at 514 (Douglas, J., concurring). "Those who make their living through
exercise of First Amendment rights are no less entitled to its protection than those
whose advocacy or promotion is not hitched to a profit motive." Id.
112. See id.
113. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
114. Id. at 385.
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male or female employees." 5 The Court suggested that adver-
tisements for legal activity would receive some First Amendment
protection, but commercial speech advertising illegal activity
would not."6 "Any First Amendment interest which might be
served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and
which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest sup-
porting the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial
activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is inci-
dental to a valid limitation on economic activity.""7
Finally, in Bigelow v. Virginia,"8 the Supreme Court limited
the Chrestensen holding by abandoning the idea that commercial
speech was without First Amendment protection."9 The Court
struck down a statute that made the circulation of any publica-
tion to encourage or promote abortion illegal, rejecting the con-
tention that the commercial nature of the publication left it un-
protected by the First Amendment. 2 ° The Court held that re-
strictions on advertising must serve a legitimate public interest,
but it reserved judgment on whether the First Amendment "per-
mits regulation of advertising that is related to activities the
State may legitimately regulate or even prohibit."'2 ' By ac-
knowledging the importance of commercial speech in the mar-
ketplace of ideas, the Court articulated a willingness to extend
First Amendment protection to commercial speech. 2
Shortly after the Bigelow decision, the Court established the
foundation of the commercial speech doctrine. In Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,2'
the Supreme Court held that a statute banning licensed phar-
macists from advertising the prices of prescription drugs was an
unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech.'24 The Court
reasoned that access to information is crucial to an enlightened
115. Id.
116. Id. at 389.
117. Id.
118. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 825-26.
121. Id. at 825.
122. Id. at 825-26.
123. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
124. Id.
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society, and, within the marketplace of ideas, commercial speech
is "indispensable to the proper allocation of resources."" The
economic motivation behind commercial speech does not elimi-
nate First Amendment protection, although it does differentiate
the speech from other types of speech." 6 The Court articulated
the need to restrict speech that fails to provide truthful or verifi-
able commercial information, suggesting that false or deceptive
commercial speech would not be entitled to any First
Amendment protection,"' and recognized that the distinguish-
ing factor between commercial speech and other types of speech
was content."'
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes
may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to
who is producing and selling what product, for what reason,
and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly
free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in
large measure will be made through numerous private eco-
nomic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those
decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed.
To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indis-
pensable."9
Giving little weight to the effect the speech may have on its re-
cipients, the Court, in its seven-to-two decision, found no sup-
port for suppressing truthful information about lawful activi-
ty.13
0
Virginia Pharmacy was a progressive step in the shaping of
the commercial speech doctrine. In subsequent cases, the Court
made it clear that commercial speech and noncommercial speech
were distinct entities. Without such a differentiation, it was
125. Id. at 765.
126. Id. at 761.
127. Id. at 771. "The First Amendment, as we construe it today, does not prohibit
the State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as
well as freely." Id. at 771-72.
128. Id. at 761. "Purely factual matter of public interest may claim protection." Id.
at 762.
129. Id. at 765.
130. Id. at 773; see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700 (1987)
(agreeing that advertisements for contraception, a lawful activity, could not be sup-
pressed).
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feared that First Amendment protection would be levelled and
diluted.131 In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n," the Court
recognized that commercial speech occupies a "subordinate posi-
tion in the scale of First Amendment values," and thus requires
"regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncom-
mercial expression.
" 13
With the distinction between commercial speech and noncom-
mercial speech established, the Court was obligated to define
commercial speech and to identify the level of protection it de-
served. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission". defined commercial speech as "expression relat-
ed solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audi-
ence."135 The Court recognized the protection afforded commer-
cial speech in earlier cases and explicitly reaffirmed its disdain
for the "highly paternalistic" view that government has the un-
limited power to suppress or regulate all commercial speech to
protect its recipients. 36 Nonetheless, the decision rested on
whether the kind of speech at issue was an area traditionally
subject to government regulation. 37 In other words, the nature
of the advertised activity and the government interest in re-
stricting expression related to the activity became significant in
determining the protection available to particular commercial
expressions.
The Court developed a four-part analysis for commercial
speech cases.138 To gain any First Amendment protection, the
commercial speech must concern lawful activity and not be mis-
131. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
132. Id.
133. Id. A ban on in-person solicitation by attorneys was upheld primarily because
of the undue influence and deceptive tactics that a lawyer could use to elicit busi-
ness, as well as the invasion of privacy that such advertising promotes. Id. at 465.
A target of in-person solicitation is "[u]nlike the reader of an advertisement, who
can 'effectively avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting
[his] eyes.'" Id. at 465 n.25 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
134. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
135. Id. at 561.
136. Id. at 562.
137. Id. The New York Public Service Commission wanted to prevent electric utili-
ties in New York State from distributing advertisements promoting the use of elec-
tricity. Id. at 558.
138. Id. at 566.
1995] 1535
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1519
leading.'39 The speech may then be regulated if the asserted
government interest is substantial, the regulation is narrowly
drawn to directly advance the asserted government interest, and
the regulation is no more extensive than necessary. 4 ' The Cen-
tral Hudson test set forth a framework for analyzing commercial
speech cases, but it also created new ambiguities as courts
struggled to define each prong of the test.
The concurrence and dissent in Central Hudson identified
divergent perspectives regarding commercial speech protection.
Justice Blackmun, in concurrence, questioned the origins of the
test, asserting that the test was "not consistent with our prior
cases and does not provide adequate protection for truthful,
nonmisleading, noncoercive commercial speech."' He envi-
sioned few instances, if any, in which the government could re-
strict expression because of the effect its message might have on
the public." Justice Rehnquist argued, in dissent, that com-
mercial speech deserves much less First Amendment protection
than noncommercial speech." He believed that, by labelling
economic regulation as free speech, the Court had revitalized
Lochner era decisions' and would "unduly impair the state
legislature's ability to adopt legislation reasonably designed to
promote interests that have always been rightly thought to be of
great importance to the State."'45 Although the Central Hudson
test has been used repeatedly to evaluate commercial speech
restrictions, for all intents and purposes, these opposing view-
points have shaped the decisions. "'
Since the Central Hudson decision, the Court has continued to
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 575-76.
143. Id. at 584 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 591. During the era of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), "it
was common practice for [the] Court to strike down economic regulations adopted by
a State based on the Court's own notions of the most appropriate means for the
State to implement its considered policies." Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 589
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 585.
146. For a more detailed review of the history of commercial speech, see David F.
McGowan, Comment, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L. REV. 359
(1990).
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refine the balancing test through its application. In Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego,'4' the Court found that an ordinance
imposing substantial prohibitions on the erection of billboards
directly advanced the substantial government interest in pre-
serving the aesthetic beauty of the city." The legislature's
reasoning that billboards adversely affect traffic safety and the
appearance of the city was not "manifestly unreasonable.' 49
Board of Trustees v. Fox5 ' further shaped the fourth prong of
the Central Hudson test by requiring only a "reasonable fit"
between the government's interest and the restrictions im-
posed.15" '
Changes in the personnel of the Court led to a shift in the
focus of the Central Hudson test in Posadas de Puerto Rico Asso-
ciates v. Tourism Co., 5' with Justice Rehnquist leading the
narrow majority. The Court's decision in Posadas implied that
government could more easily regulate commercial speech and
that unlimited deference would be given to legislative determi-
nations.'53 The majority in Posadas upheld the constitutional-
ity of a Puerto Rico statute restricting advertising for casino
gambling, a legal activity in Puerto Rico.'54 The deference giv-
en to the Puerto Rican legislature in applying the Central Hud-
son test suggests the Court's analysis was just a routine exer-
cise. The Court did, however, expressly reject a tenet of Virginia
Pharmacy.5 ' "[Blecause the government could have enacted a
147. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
148. Id. at 510. Billboards inherently cause "esthetic harm." Id.
149. Id. at 509.
150. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
151. Id. at 480.
152. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
153. Id. The Court seemed to adopt the standard for legislative value-determina-
tions set forth in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
The doctrine .. . that due process authorizes courts to hold laws uncon-
stitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely-has long
since been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional
proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs
for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.
Id. at 730.
154. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 348.
155. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
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wholesale prohibition of the underlying conduct... it is permis-
sible for the government to take the less intrusive step of allow-
ing the conduct, but reducing the demand through restrictions
on advertising."'56 Three of the four Justices dissenting from
the Posadas majority, cited the relaxed standards used to uphold
the regulation and the unlimited deference accorded the Puerto
Rican legislature.'57
The Posadas decision left the commercial-speech doctrine in
disarray.'58 By suggesting that a total ban on truthful advertis-
ing for a legal activity was a constitutionally valid restriction on
commercial speech, the Court extended the power of government
to regulate commercial speech, making legislative decision mak-
ing definitive, regardless of First Amendment implications. 5 '
Such an approach to commercial speech could lead only to cen-
sorship of any advertising that the legislature found offensive or
unacceptable. 6 ° This rationale perpetuates consumer igno-
rance in an effort to control behavior by keeping the public unin-
formed. The Court had specifically warned against such a slip-
pery slope because it could lead to censorship and the deteriora-
tion of the marketplace of ideas.'6 ' "[W]e, [the Court], view as
dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public
ignorance." "'
THREE RECENT COMMERCIAL SPEECH DECISIONS
After Posadas, the Court did not attempt to resolve the confu-
sion surrounding the commercial-speech doctrine until the 1993-
156. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 346 (emphasis omitted).
157. Id. at 351, 355 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.);
see also id. at 359-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.)
(dissenting on grounds that the majority holding sanctioned censorship and prior re-
straint).
158. For a more detailed discussion of Posadas, see The Supreme Court, 1985
Term-Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 172-82 (1986).
159. See Vestal, supra note 42, at 135-38 (discussing Posadas).
160. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 361 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall &
Blackmun, JJ.).
161. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 374-75 (1977). The preferred
solution is to disclose more and not less information and thereby arm the public
with enough information to view advertising in its proper perspective. Id. at 375.
162. Id. at 375.
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1994 Term. Two of the three cases recently decided renounce
Posadas as a fact-specific aberration in commercial-speech cases
and reaffirm the Court's commitment to abandoning the slippery
slope toward censorship.'63 Though all three cases are in some
ways difficult to reconcile,TM overall, the Court has established
that (1) the government has the burden of justifying its substan-
tial interest and the means used to achieve that end, (2) deferen-
tial treatment of legislative judgment will not be accepted as
readily as it was in Posadas, and (3) commercial speech does
have some value in the marketplace of ideas that justifies First
Amendment protection.'65
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network6
In City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, a six-to-three opin-
ion authored by Justice Stevens, the Court invalidated an ordi-
nance that banned the Discovery Network from distributing
their commercial publications through freestanding news racks
located on public property. 7 The prohibited publication was a
free magazine that advertised educational, recreational, and
social programs available to individuals in Cincinnati.' The
163. Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Net-
work, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993). But see United States v. Edge Broadcasting, 113
S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
164. See Floyd Abrams, A Growing Marketplace of Ideas, LEGAL TIMES, July 26,
1993, at S28. "In the commercial-speech area, as much as in any other in recent
years, Supreme Court opinions often fail to relate to one another at all." Id.
165. Id.
What our decisions require is a "fit" between the legislature's ends and
the means chosen to accomplish those ends-a fit that is not necessarily
perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best
disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served;
that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but . . . a means
narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective. Within those bounds
we leave it to governmental decisionmakers to judge what manner of
regulation may best be employed. ... [Slince the State bears the burden
of justifying its restriction, it must affirmatively establish the reasonable
fit we require.
Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1510 n.12 (citing Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
166. 113 U.S. 1505 (1993).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1508.
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Supreme Court relied on the four-part test set forth in Central
Hudson to determine if the statute violated the First Amend-
ment."5 9 The publications involved lawful activity and were in
no way misleading or deceptive. 7 ' The Court found that the
city .had a substantial interest in providing safe and aestheti-
cally pleasing public streets for its citizens and that the news
racks could be considered hazardous and unsightly. 7' How-
ever, by removing only the 62 "commercial" news racks of the
over 1500 "noncommercial" ones throughout Cincinnati, the city
failed to establish a "reasonable fit" between the legislature's re-
striction on commercial speech and the substantial interest as-
serted.172 The regulatory scheme banned only those news racks
that disseminated commercial speech.'73 The remaining news
racks were just as hazardous and unsightly; the city's only rea-
son for allowing them to remain was because they disseminated
noncommercial speech-newspapers.'74
The majority's decision in Discovery Network clarified several
aspects of the commercial-speech doctrine.7 ' By striking down
Cincinnati's ban on commercial news racks, the Court reaffirmed
the "reasonable fit" standard articulated in Board of Trustees v.
Fox76 and affirmed the intermediate level of review set forth
in the Central Hudson case.'77 Defining "reasonable fit" more
precisely, the Court rejected a least-restrictive-means require-
ment yet qualified that "if there are numerous and obvious less-
169. Id. at 1510.
170. Id. at 1509.
171. Id. at 1510-11.
172. Id. at 1510.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1511-13.
175. See Steven W. Colford, Big Win for Commercial Speech: Industry Cheers Su-
preme Court Ruling in Cincinnati Newsrack Case, ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 29, 1993,
at 1. For a more detailed discussion, see Supreme Court Proceedings: Review of Su-
preme Court's Term, 62 U.S.L.W. 3045, 3046-47 (1993) [hereinafter Supreme Court
Proceedings]; Abrams, supra note 164, at S28.
176. 492 U.S. 469 (1989); see also Abrams, supra note 164, at S28 (discussing the
Court's decision to clarify the "reasonable fit" standard).
177. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1511-13; see also Bernard H. Siegan, Su-
preme Court Decisions Reaffirm Need To Provide Commercial Speech Full Constitu-
tional Protection, LEGAL OPINION LETTER (Wash. Legal Found., Wash., D.C.), Oct. 1,
1993, at 1 (discussing the Court's reliance on the Central Hudson test for commer-
cial speech cases).
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burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech,
that is certainly a relevant consideration in determining wheth-
er the 'fit' between ends and means is reasonable."'78 No rigid
definition of commercial speech existed, and this case illustrated
"the difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin com-
mercial speech in a distinct category.""'9 Instead, the Court
recommended a careful examination of the speech at issue "to
ensure that speech deserving of greater constitutional protection
is not inadvertently suppressed."8 ' By rejecting the "low val-
ue" of commercial speech as justification for the distinction be-
tween commercial and noncommercial news racks, the Court
reinforced the worth of commercial speech in the marketplace of
ideas.' 8 ' This case reaffirmed and even strengthened the
protections that the First Amendment affords commercial
speech.
Edenfield v. Fane'8'
Edenfield v. Fane was the second commercial-speech case de-
cided by the Supreme Court in the 1993-1994 Term. The Florida
statute at issue prohibited certified public accountants (CPAs)
from making "direct, in-person, uninvited solicitations."83 The
Court had recognized in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n', that
personal commercial solicitation involved some detrimental as-
pects.'85 The Court, however, recognized in Edenfield that
"these detriments are not so inherent ... that solicitation of this
sort is removed from the ambit of First Amendment protec-
178. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1510 n.13.
179. Id. at 1511.
180. Id. at 1513 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983)).
181. Id. at 1516.
In the absence of some basis for distinguishing between 'newspapers" and
"commercial handbills" that is relevant to an interest asserted by the
city, we are unwilling to recognize Cincinnati's bare assertion that the
"low value" of commercial speech is a sufficient justification for its selec-
tive and categorical ban on newsracks dispensing "commercial handbills."
Id.
182. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
183. Id. at 1796 (quoting FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 21A-24.002(c) (1992)).
184. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
185. Id. at 464.
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tion."' 8 The Court found that, although the government's in-
terests in proscribing solicitation by CPAs were substantial, the
government had failed to demonstrate that its restriction on
solicitation advanced the asserted interest.87 "[Regulation
may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote
support for the government's purpose."'
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy emphasized that
the burden for justifying a restriction on commercial speech will
not be satisfied by "mere speculation or conjecture."' 9 The gov-
ernment "must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real
and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
degree."9' Applying these standards, the Supreme Court
struck down Florida's statute based on the state's failure to
demonstrate that a reasonable fit existed between the
government's interests in preventing fraud, ensuring privacy,
and maintaining CPA independence and the ban on in-house
solicitation by CPAs. 9'
Both this decision and Discovery Network dismantle the rea-
soning used in Posadas and thus reinforce the theory that
Posadas should be confined to its facts. The Court would no
longer accept Puerto Rico's asserted means and ends without
evidence to link the two. "[M]ere speculation and conjecture" are
not enough to achieve a "reasonable fit."'92 In both Edenfield
and Discovery Network, the Court rejected the contention that,
as long as the interests asserted are substantial, the legislature
should receive considerable deference in determining a reason-
able way to accomplish the interests advanced.'93 By rejecting
this paternalistic philosophy, the Court challenged the holding
186. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1797.
187. Id. at 1800.
188. Id. (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 564 (1980)).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1799-1801. For a more detailed discussion, see Felix H. Kent, Two More
Decisions on Commercial Speech, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 1993, at 3; Supreme Court Pro-
ceedings, supra note 175.
192. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1800.
193. Id. at 1792; City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505,
1516 (1993).
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in Posadas that the government can regulate advertising if it
can restrict the underlying activity." Because very few ac-
tivities are constitutionally protected, the Posadas holding sug-
gested that government can regulate almost any advertising.1
5
If the Court subscribed to this proposition, it would be necessary
to provide great deference to the legislature to determine which
advertising should be banned, and, as long as the Court found a
substantial interest, the restriction would be upheld. 9 ' With-
out such deference to the legislature, it would be difficult to al-
low government to regulate advertising of any regulable activity.
The two positions are irreconcilable.
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.'97
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., because it involved
the underlying activity of gambling, appears to be an affirmation
of Posadas.95 In Edge, the Court upheld a federal ban restrict-
ing broadcasters licensed in nonlottery states from broadcasting
lottery advertisements over their airwaves.' However, the
majority declined to decide the case on the basis that gambling
is not a constitutionally protected right and the greater power to
prohibit gambling altogether includes the lesser power to ban its
advertisement.00 Instead, the majority applied the Central
Hudson test and found a reasonable fit between the imposed
restriction and the government's interest in supporting the poli-
cy of nonlottery states.20'
Some legal commentators view Edge as a setback to First
Amendment protection of commercial speech.0 2 The Court's
194. Kent, supra note 191.
195. See Vestal, supra note 42, at 138-39.
196. See Abrams, supra note 164.
197. 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2703; see also Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S.
328 (1986) (finding both reasons as the basis for its holding).
201. Edge, 113 S. Ct. at 2703-05.
202. See Abrams, supra note 164, at S29; Siegan, supra note 177. But see Kent,
supra note 191, at 28 (suggesting that Edge does not "constitute a significant depar-
ture from the recent commercial speech protection cases" because it is confined to its
facts).
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use of reasoning from Posadas, after abandoning much of this
same rationale in Edenfield and Discovery Network, is irreconcil-
able with any progress made in the first two cases. By failing to
require specific evidence from the government to meet its "rea-
sonable fit" burden, the Court ignored its recent holding in
Edenfield. °3 In addition, the Court took a paternalistic ap-
proach, which it often has criticized, by restricting the flow of
information in an attempt to protect the listeners in the nonlot-
tery state from lottery advertisements." 4 Using a deferential
analysis of commercial speech, the Court stated that courts may
"allow room for legislative judgments.""5
The most plausible explanation for the divergent holding and
reasoning in Edge stems from the Court's bias against gam-
bling." 6 The Court views gambling as a vice that historically
has been regulated or prohibited; and, therefore, regulation of
gambling advertisements is acceptable." 7 Such a bias limits
the precedential value of the decision. Nonetheless, courts could
extend Edge to other vices that affect the health and welfare of
the public-affecting the First Amendment freedoms of cigarette
advertisers, alcohol advertisers, and even condom advertis-
ers.2"8 The future implications of the 1993-1994 Term's deci-
sions on commercial speech, especially advertising, are uncer-
tain. Justice White, the author of Edge, is no longer on the
Court, and, with the recent retirement of Justice Blackmun,
another protector of advertising has been lost. °9 Justices
Ginsberg and Breyer's opinions on this subject are not yet
203. Edge, 113 S. Ct. at 2704. The Court stated that it had "no doubt that the
statutes directly advanced the governmental interest at stake." Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 2707. For a more detailed discussion, see Kent, supra note 191; Siegan,
supra note 177.
206. See Abrams, supra note 164, at S29.
207. Id.
208. Justice Rehnquist has compared advertising gambling to advertising cigarettes.
He fears that by protecting pure commercial advertising and eliminating regulations
that ban certain advertisements, the Court will open the door to "the active promo-
tion of prescription drugs, liquor, cigarettes, and other products the use of which it
has previously been thought desirable to discourage." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 781 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting).
209. Kent, supra note 191, at 3.
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known and can only be the subject of conjecture.21
Determining the harmful effects of speech is not a prong of
the Central Hudson test, and such an analysis would only incor-
porate the idea that government has the right to withhold infor-
mation from the public as a means of protection. As Justice
Stevens stated in his dissenting opinion in Edge, the restriction
on commercial speech is "the most intrusive, and dangerous
form of regulation possible-a ban on truthful information re-
garding a lawful activity imposed for the purpose of manipulat-
ing, through ignorance, the consumer choices of some of its citi-
zens."
211
Overall, these three cases have strengthened First Amend-
ment protection of commercial speech. The Court has refined the
Central Hudson test and reaffirmed the value of commercial
speech. However, the Court has by no means made the analysis
routine. As a result, the question remains as to whether govern-
ment can regulate or even ban advertisements of legal activity.
This gray area will not only cause dissension among the lower
courts but also was the cause pf the FTC's protracted debate on
whether to ban Joe Camel, advertising of a harmful but legal
activity.
THE FEDERAL TRADE CoMMIssIoN
The FTC is an independent administrative agency created
pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 (FTC
Act).212 The FTC is comprised of five Commissioners appointed
to seven-year terms by the President and confirmed by the Sen-
ate.213 The primary responsibility of the FTC is to put into ef-
fect several statutes designed to "promote competition and to
protect the public from unfair and deceptive acts and practices
in the advertising and marketing of goods and services."2 4
Section five of the FTC Act at first gave the FTC only the
210. Id.
211. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2710 (1993).
212. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)).
213. 15 U.S.C. § 41.
214. 16 C.F.R. § 0.1 (1994).
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antitrust authority to prohibit all "unfair methods of
competition."21 In 1938, the Act was amended to increase the
FTC's authority in the consumer protection arena by declaring
any "unfair or deceptive acts or practices ... unlawful."216 To-
day, the FTC is organized into two bureaus-the Bureau of
Competition and the Bureau of Consumer Protection.217 The
Bureau of Competition pursues noncriminal antitrust conduct,
whereas the consumer protection arm enforces consumer pro-
tection laws enacted by Congress, as well as trade regulation
rules issued by the FTC.21 A third bureau, the Bureau of Eco-
nomics, provides research, analysis, and evaluation services to
the other two Bureaus.1 9
The FTC can act in several different ways to restrain
anticompetitive business practices or to keep the marketplace
free of unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent practices.22 The FTC
can issue a complaint and litigate the question in an administra-
tive proceeding, or it can seek an injunction in federal court or
issue general rules to regulate an entire industry.221 However,
the FTC Act's failure to define the scope of the FTC's authority
left the Commission with great latitude to interpret its regulato-
ry power particularly with respect to conduct it deemed "un-
fair. )2 2
2
215. 15 U.S.C. § 45; see also Edward B. Cohen & William I. Rothbard, Reautho-
rizing the FTC Back into the Future, LEGAL TIMEs, July 5, 1993, at 29.
216. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
217. Neil W. Averitt & Terry Calvani, The Role of the FTC in American Society, 39





222. Cohen & Rothbard, supra note 215, at 29. The Supreme Court, in FTC v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972), affirmed that the "unfairness" lan-
guage could be interpreted to give the FTC broad authority in proscribing practices
it found unfair. Id. at 244. "[Tlhe Court declared that unfairness authority extended
to 'public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the
spirit of the antitrust laws.'" Id.
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Authority of the FTC To Ban Advertisements
The FTC led a relatively noncontroversial existence until
1969. In 1969, two reports were published criticizing the inactiv-
ity and lack of initiative of the FTC.2" As a result, Congress
demanded increased activity, and the FTC responded by initiat-
ing new, aggressive projects. 4 Congress did not discourage the
agency's new activism and in fact increased the FTC's authori-
ty 22
5
In the consumer protection arena, the FTC proposed a ban on
advertising designed to influence children.226 Spurred by con-
gressional prodding, the FTC launched the "Kid-Vid" proceeding
to disclose whether advertising directed at children was unfair
or deceptive on the theory that children were "too young to ap-
preciate the commercial and self-promotional nature of advertis-
ing."227 The proceeding was an effort to find remedies to rectify
any adverse effects caused by the advertising.2
28
Public outcry and criticism of the proceeding, in addition to
general displeasure with the ineffectiveness and overreaching of
other FTC initiatives, prompted Congress in 1980 to terminate
the Kid-Vid proceeding and several other FTC proceedings as
part of a three-year reauthorization.22 9 The Federal Trade
223. EDWARD F. COX ET AL., 'THE NADER REPORT' ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COM-
MISSION (1969); REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION To STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (1969). "[Tlhese criticisms . . . ignited a frenzy of activity and reform at
the FTC." Cohen & Rothbard, supra note 215, at 29.
224. Senator Gale W. McGee (D-Wis.) advised the chairman of the FTC, "the mis-
takes you are to make ought to be mistakes in doing and trying rather than playing
safe in not doing." Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer Protection Appropria-
tions for Fiscal Year 1972: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Appropriations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2673 (1971); see also Cohen & Rothbard, supra
note 215 (reasoning that the undefined scope of the FTC's authority and the liberal
regulatory era of the 1970s were the primary contributors to the FTC's changing
role).
225. See Averitt & Calvani, supra note 217, at 42. The agency's total budget more
than doubled between 1969 and 1978. Id. Statutory authority also increased substan-
tially. See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 57(a)-57(b) (1988) (giving the FTC authority to more actively safe-
guard consumer interests).
226. See FTC STAFF REPORT ON TELEVISION ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN (Feb. 1978).
227. Averitt & Calvani, supra note 217, at 42; see also Cohen & Rothbard, supra
note 215, at 29 (discussing the origin and goals of the "Kid Vid" proceeding).
228. Cohen & Rothbard, supra note 215, at 29.
229. Id.; see also Averitt & Calvani, supra note 217, at 39 (discussing Congress'
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Commission Improvements Act of 1980 eliminated the
Commission's authority to regulate unfair advertising through
1982.23o
The Kid-Vid controversy has lived on in the continuing con-
gressional debate about the proper role of the FTC in regulating
unfair advertising, and, as a result, Congress has failed to
reauthorize the FTC since the early 1980s.2"' Since 1982, the
FTC has remained operational thanks to the appropriation
committees' reluctant earmarking of money for the agency in the
absence of an authorization bill.232 The fundamental disagree-
ment in Congress is whether the FTC has authority to make
"'industry-wide regulations governing unfair advertising.'
233
Dismantled by Congress and governed by the appropriations
committees, the FTC has been thwarted in its efforts to develop
a national strategy to protect the consumer. 4 With no federal
agency protecting the consumer, states have filled the gap by
suing advertisers. 235 However, the tide is changing for the
FTC. Congress finally passed an FTC reauthorization bill on
August 11, 1994, and President Clinton signed it into law on
August 26.236
Despite the lack of support in Congress, many recognize that,
in the past five years, the FTC successfully has created its niche
in the regulatory world by focusing on its role as a law enforce-
ment agency and less as an agency enabling a political agen-
changed view of the FTC).
230. 15 U.S.C. § 57(i) (1988). This restriction did not affect the FTC's authority
over deceptive or false advertising. Id. § 5.7(a).
231. Cohen & Rothbard, supra note 215, at 29.
232. See Showdown on Capitol Hill, FTC: WATCH (Wash. Reg. Rptg. Assocs.), No.
390, May 24, 1993 [hereinafter Showdown] (discussing the showdown between the
House and Senate over adding riders to various appropriations bills to reauthorize
the FTC).
233. Id. (quoting Apr. 29, 1993, letter from House Commerce Committee Chairman,
John Dingell, to Chairman of House Appropriations Subcommittee, Neal Smith, dis-
cussing FTC reauthorization).
234. Cohen & Rothbard, supra note 215, at 30. "Deregulation, combined with a
gridlocked Congress, made the FTC virtually irrelevant as the national cop on the
marketing beat." Id.
235. Id. (discussing the FTC's slow efforts to create boundaries for environmental
advertising and the state activism that ensued until such guidelines were set forth).
236. Reauthorization, FTC: WATCH (Wash. Reg. Rptg. Assoc.), No. 418, Sept. 12,
1994 [hereinafter Reauthorization].
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da.237 The new reauthorization incorporates the FTC's formal
definition of the term "'unfair."23 For a practice to be unfair,
(1) it must substantially injure the consumer, (2) the consumer
must not be able to reasonably avoid the injury, (3) the injury
must not be outweighed by offsetting benefits resulting from the
practice, -and (4) these findings cannot be based solely on the
grounds that the practice offends public policy.239 The FTC also
refuses to accept anecdotal evidence as a basis for promulgating
industry-wide rules.240
The FTC has made progress in developing guidelines for its
regulatory actions to combat unfairness in advertising, and, with
the new reauthorization, the guidelines may become even more
defined. Up to this point, however, the FTC's evolution and
policy statements have paralleled the Supreme Court's efforts to
define the constitutional protection afforded commercial speech.
Do the FTCs Regulatory Actions Pass Constitutional Muster?
The three FTC commissioners who voted against issuing the
complaint to ban Joe Camel based their vote on the fact that,
without more evidence to link Joe Camel to an increase in un-
derage smokers, the FTC could not determine that RJR had
violated the law.24' In other words, such a ban could not sur-
237. As noted by Averitt and Calvani:
In the past five years, however, the agency has settled upon a new sense
of its own mission. We believe this sense of identity will be more stable
and lasting because it is founded ultimately on a principled, functional
definition of the agency's law enforcement role, rather than on the more
transitory imperatives of any one group's values or political agenda.
Averitt & Calvani, supra note 217, at 39.
238. See Commission Statement of Pol'y on the Scope of the Consumer Unfairness
Jurisdiction, 104 F.T.C. 949, 979 app. (1984).
239. Reauthorization, supra note 236.
240. See Credit Practices Rule: Statement of Basis and Purpose and Regulatory
Analysis, 49 Fed. Reg. 7740, 7742 (1984) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 144).
241. Joe Camel: Steiger Disappointed, Yao Disgruntled at Decision Not To Sue,
FTC: WATCH (Wash. Reg. Rptg. Assoc.), No. 415, June 27, 1994. "[I]t was the law
that won the day. While noting that a concern about the health of children had 'led
us to consider every possible avenue to a lawsuit,' the majority noted that each of
those avenues was a road to nowhere when 'factual and legal questions' were
raised." Id.
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vive a legal challenge.242 Although this decision may provide
an indication of the fate of future efforts to ban cigarette adver-
tising logos such as Joe Camel, differences exist between the
analysis done by the FTC and the analysis done by the Supreme
Court with regard to commercial speech.
The difference between the Supreme Court's analysis of com-
mercial speech and the FTC's analysis is that the FTC uses a
public policy and anticompetition approach, whereas the Court
uses a substantial-state-interest test.243 Obviously, the FTC
considers the First Amendment issues involved. However, the
changing state of the commercial-speech doctrine has raised
much uncertainty as to whether FTC advertising restrictions
would pass constitutional muster.2"
Although the approach may be different, the basic analyses
share many similarities. As the Court refines the commercial
speech doctrine and the FTC defines its policy, the two share
common goals-protecting the free marketplace of ideas and
retreating from the "slippery slope" of censorship. The Supreme
Court has imposed a more stringent burden on the government
in justifying a restriction on commercial speech.245 A govern-
mental body "seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial
speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and
that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material de-
gree." 246 This requirement of the Central Hudson test is similar
242. Id.
243. C. Lee Peeler & Michelle K. Rusk, Commercial Speech and the FTC's Consum-
er Protection Program, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 985, 986 (1991) ("[Tihe Commission's policy
statement on unfairness jurisdiction has made it clear that it will look to public
policy, as established by common law or statute, as a means of providing additional
evidence of consumer injury . . . ."); see also Patricia P. Bailey, How Advertising Is
Regulated in the United States, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 531 (1985) (discussing the effect
of advertising bans on competition).
244. Compare Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986)
(upholding a statute restricting advertising for casino gambling) with United States
v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993) (declining to follow Posadas and
find a constitutional right to prohibit advertising of lotteries); compare Edenfield v.
Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993) (striking a ban on in-person solicitation by accountants)
with Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (upholding a ban on in-
person solicitation by attorneys).
245. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1792.
246. Id. at 1800.
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to the statistical data required by the FTC to justify any regula-
tions based on unfairness in advertising.24 ' Also, by requiring a
"reasonable fit" between the restriction and the substantial in-
terest,24 the Court has adopted the standard traditionally
used by the FTC in promulgating an order. A regulatory order
promulgated by the FTC must bear a "reasonable relationship"
to the violation.249
Despite similarities, the Court's changing definition of com-
mercial speech has a direct impact on the FTC's regulatory ac-
tivity. Although the Court articulated the basic definition of
commercial speech in Central Hudson,250 it has reflected on
and refined this definition in more recent cases. Such constant
revision makes the FTC's task of regulating the advertising
industry without violating the First Amendment more difficult.
In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products,5' the Court established
that, although advertising "links a product to a current public
debate" or contains "discussion of important public issues," the
speech is not necessarily entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion.252 More recently in Board of Trustees v. Fox, 253 the
Court held that the basic test for identifying commercial speech
is that the speech "proposes a commercial transaction."254 How-
ever, in less straightforward cases, the Court has focused on the
economic motivation of the speaker and the audience 255 and
has examined the speech "carefully to ensure that speech de-
serving of greater constitutional protection is not inadvertently
suppressed."256 These changing definitions have added to the
247. See supra notes 134-46 and accompanying text.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 150-51, 176.
249. Peeler & Rusk, supra note 243, at 988.
250. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
251. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
252. Id. at 64-68 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 563 (1980)).
253. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
254. Id. at 473 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
255. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
256. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1513 (1993) (quoting Bolger,
463 U.S. at 66); see also Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796
(1988) (taking into consideration whether the commercial and noncommercial speech
implicated are inextricably intertwined).
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uncertainty of whether an FTC ban of Joe Camel advertisements
would pass constitutional muster.
The deference given to regulatory agencies in commercial-
speech cases is another area of the law that has substantial
impact on the actions and direction taken by the FTC. By not
requiring strict-scrutiny review of commercial-speech cases, the
Court has given regulatory bodies latitude in promulgating re-
strictions. Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. ' 7
and Fox. suggested that any reasonable restriction would be
upheld with little inquiry into the actual relationship between
the restriction and the government's interest. However, more
recent cases have reexamined the use of such a deferential stan-
dard of review.25
Could the FTC Have Banned Joe Camel?
A ban of Joe Camel pits the rights of the FTC to protect the
public from harmful advertising against the First Amendment
rights of cigarette companies to advertise their products. Health
organizations and public interest groups have been pushing the
FTC to ban Joe Camel advertisements because they purportedly
entice children to smoke.26 RJR claims that Joe Camel is not
aimed at hooking new smokers but is an effort to persuade ex-
isting smokers to buy their brand and to maintain brand loyal-
ty.
2 6 1
Although many proponents of the ban scoff at the tobacco
industry's arguments-attributing them to an egregious desire
to make money at the expense of children-no one can say with
certainty that Joe Camel encourages children to start smok-
ing.262 The statistics show only that Joe Camel successfully
257. 478 U.S. 328, 344 (1986) (Court had no evidence to support the assertion that
a ban on advertising gambling would achieve Puerto Rico's interest in protecting its
citizens from increased prostitution and immoral behavior).
258. Fox, 492 U.S. at 473 (holding that the third prong of the Central Hudson test
does not require a least-restrictive-means analysis).
259. See supra notes 189-96 and accompanying text.
260. Farhi, supra note 5, at C1.
261. Id.
262. Rosemond, supra note 26, at El.
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entices teenage smokers to choose Camel brand cigarettes.263
In addition, the influence of parents, friends, and family mem-
bers who smoke contribute significantly to a child's decision to
begin smoking."' Considering that seventy-five percent of all
teenagers who smoke have parents who smoke,265 these chil-
dren may have a predisposition to smoke. Banning Joe Camel
cigarette advertisements could have some effect on the number
of people who smoke, but the more probable effect will be to de-
crease the number of people who smoke Camel brand ciga-
rettes.266
Despite the argument that the FTC's attempt to protect the
public from smoking is misplaced, to prove its case, the FTC
would have had to claim that the advertisements are unfair
because they attempt to entice children to do something that
they are not, in many states, legally allowed to do-buy ciga-
rettes. 7 The FTC, by its definition of "unfair," would have had
to establish that (1) Joe Camel advertisements substantially
injure consumers, (2) consumers are not able to avoid the injury,
and (3) the injury outweighs the advertisements' benefits.6
Without more correlative evidence that Joe Camel advertise-
ments cause children to smoke, it would have been difficult,
though not impossible, to prove that these advertisements sub-
stantially injure consumers. In a hailstorm of criticism, however,
the FTC has abandoned past attempts to ban advertising that
influences children.269 Although public sentiment probably
would have supported a ban of "Old Joe,"27° the FTC commis-
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PuB. No. 87-8397, SMOKING, TO-
BACCO AND HEALTH: A FACT BOOK (1989).
266. For example, in Norway, where cigarette advertising has been banned, 36% of
15-year-olds smoke. However, in Hong Kong, where there are very few restrictions
on tobacco advertising, only 11% of 15-year-olds smoke. Cross-National Study by
London's INFO-TAM and Children's Research Unit, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1989, at
B1.
267. The FTC has won cases using the "unfairness doctrine" to restrict advertise-
ments for 900-numbers. Auerbach, supra note 27, at D9. The FTC successfully ar-
gued that it is unfair to target children in these advertisements because the children
do not pay for the calls. Id.
268. See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
270. See We Should Look at Health Issues, Not Just Smoking, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar.
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sioners may have been influenced by history in making their
decision.
DOES A BAN OF JOE CAMEL VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT?
Even if the FTC had decided to ban Joe Camel, such a ban
may have violated the First Amendment right to free speech.
Advertisements inviting consumers to buy cigarettes qualify as
commercial speech." 1 Although the advertisements arguably
are misleading because they "glamorize smoking by associating
it with adventuresome, athletic, sexual, or creative activity,"272
the Supreme Court defines "inherently misleading" advertising
as those messages that encourage fraud, overreaching, or confu-
sion.273 Cigarette advertising does not promote fraud, over-
reaching, or confusion and, therefore, is not legally
misleading."'
Because smoking is a legal activity, the Constitution does not
allow prohibiting cigarette advertising. However, in many states,
smoking by children under the age of eighteen is illegal, and
some argue that, in these states, advertisements that appeal to
children are also illegal. However, it will be necessary for propo-
nents of this argument to present a much stronger link between
Joe Camel advertisements and the sale of cigarettes to people
under eighteen years old.
The courts would apply the Central Hudson test to determine
if a regulation banning Joe Camel violates the First Amendment
rights of RJR.27 The substantial government interest advanced
for banning Joe Camel advertisements is to protect American
youth from the harmful effects of smoking. The Court most like-
18, 1992, at A10.
271. See supra notes 251-58 and accompanying text (defining commercial speech).
272. See Gostin & Brandt, supra note 32, at 906.
273. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 (1978). Public protection
from "vexatious conduct" is an important state interest. Id.
274. See Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490, 498 & n.9 (10th Cir.
1983) (finding that advertisements for alcoholic beverages are not inherently mislead-
ing), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691
(1984).
275. See supra text accompanying notes 138-40.
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ly would find this interest to be substantial."6 Clearly, smok-
ing has harmful health consequences, including lung cancer and
heart disease,277 and, as noted above, the Court is willing to
apply a more lenient standard to state actions when child wel-
fare is at issue.27
The government then must prove that the challenged regula-
tion advances this substantial interest in a direct and material
way and that a reasonable fit exists between the restriction and
the asserted interest."7 This burden will be difficult to meet.
More direct evidence is necessary to link a ban of Joe Camel to a
decrease in the number of children who smoke cigarettes.8 °
Even if the Court strikes a deferential pose, as it has in the past
when the underlying activity is considered harmful,28' or as-
sumes a paternalistic attitude,282 the government will still
have to prove that the ban is reasonable. Again, this will be a
hard burden to meet, considering the conflicting evidence that a
causal connection exists between Joe Camel advertisements and
youths who choose to smoke. However, the Court does not re-
quire a least-restrictive-means analysis,283 and Joe Camel's ap-
peal to young people arguably has some effect on whether they
decide to begin smoking.
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co. 2M and Posadas de
Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.285 both provide precedent
that supports banning advertisements for legal activity that is
considered harmful. However, other decisions suggest a depar-
ture from the idea that because the government can regulate or
ban the sale of cigarettes, it is a more acceptable and less intru-
276. Gostin & Brandt, supra note 32.
277. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. No. 89-8411, REDUCING THE
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS-A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL 11-12 (1989).
278. See supra notes 61-87 and accompanying text.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 147-51, 176-78, 248-49.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 26-40.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 152-62, 191-96.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 61-100.
283. See supra text accompanying note 178.
284. 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993); see also text accompanying notes 197-210.
285. 478 U.S. 328 (1986); see also text accompanying notes 152-62.
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sive regulation to ban cigarette advertising."6 Nonetheless, the
paternalistic bias toward protecting Americans from smoking
could be even more popular with the Court than a bias toward
protecting Americans from the vice of gambling-especially
when children are at issue.
FUTURE ATTEMPTS To BAN JOE CAMEL
Although the recent vote by the FTC commissioners not to
ban Joe Camel increases the likelihood that "Old Joe" may con-
tinue to appear in the print media, Joe Camel's opponents will
likely continue in their efforts to ban the advertisements. The
full effect of the FTC vote is unknown, but already some mem-
bers of Congress have shown interest in pursuing the issue."
One possible legislative action that could empower another agen-
cy to ban Joe Camel advertisements is passage of The Fairness
in Tobacco and Nicotine Regulation Act.28 If enacted, this leg-
islation would transfer regulation of the manufacture, sale, la-
beling, advertising, and promotion of tobacco products to the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA).289 In February 1994,
David A. Kessler, commissioner of the FDA, expressed his opin-
ion that cigarettes could be regulated as drugs by the FDA, but
he is waiting for direction from Congress before asserting this
authority.290 Such a law would shift the authority to regulate
286. See supra text accompanying notes 191-96.
287. FTC Closing Its Camel Cigarettes Investigation Without Action, FTC: WATCH
(Wash. Reg. Rptg. Assocs.), No. 414, June 6, 1994. "Congress is unlikely to let the
vote go by without some scrutiny. In fact, the agency had begun providing Rep.
Henry Waxman (D-Cal), a prominent cigarette industry foe, with the complete re-
cords of its investigation even before its decision to take no action." Id.
288. Showdown, supra note 232; H.R. REP. No. 2147, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
289. According to one Congressman:
[This legislation] would also implement regulations governing advertising
and promotion of tobacco products. In a comparable manner [sic] that the
FDA regulates other legal drugs. . . . I would like to point out that this
no longer has [sic] a First Amendment problem or issue since this is
something that we do with all legal products under the FDA.
Showdown, supra note 232 (quoting Rep. Mike Synar at a May 17, 1993, press con-
ference).
290. The Great Dromedary Debate: What We Have Here Is a Failure To Communi-
cate, FTC: WATCH (Wash. Reg. Rptg. Assocs.), No. 407, Feb. 28, 1994. Reports indi-
cate that cigarette manufacturers have the ability to control the amount of nicotine,
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cigarette advertisements from the FTC to the FDA.
State courts may also have the authority to ban Joe Camel.
Recently, the California Supreme Court, in a unanimous deci-
sion, ruled that a lawsuit challenging Joe Camel advertisements
is not preempted by federal law and can be decided by the lower
state court.29' With an amended complaint, the plaintiffs could
sue RJR for violating the state's ban on unfair business practices
alleging that "the Old Joe Camel advertising campaign targets
minors for the purpose of inducing and increasing their illegal
purchases of cigarettes."292 The court held that "Congress left
the states free to exercise their police power to protect minors
from advertising that encourages them to violate the law."293
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment protects the intellectual integrity and
right to self-determination of the individual. Banning Joe Camel
advertisements is a direct assault on these values. Although
commercial speech may be of lesser value to the marketplace of
ideas, the marketplace assumes the existence of an equal and
free flow of information. The receipt of information is determina-
tive, not the communicator's motivation behind the speech. In
other words, the speaker and the audience, not Congress, the
FTC, or the courts, should decide its value. The public should
have the opportunity to make informed choices even about which
kind of cigarette to buy. Any negative influences on children
should be counteracted not by shielding them from the informa-
tion but by advertisements that educate them and their parents
as to the harmful effects of smoking.
Nonetheless, government seems determined to regulate ciga-
rette advertising, and, when false or misleading speech or
speech that advertises an illegal activity is involved, the First
an addictive drug, in cigarettes and have increased the amount of nicotine instead of
lessening it. Id. By increasing nicotine, the manufacturers "intend" for cigarettes to
have the effect of a drug, implicating FDA authority. Id.
291. Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73 (Cal.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 577 (1994).
292. Id. at 75.
293. Id. at 83.
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Amendment is not implicated. However, regulation of advertise-
ments of a legal activity does implicate the First Amendment.
Even though the cigarettes advertised may have harmful effects,
the speech should not be compromised. A paternalistic attitude
by the judicial and legislative branches should not limit First
Amendment protection. As Justice Black once said, "[t]he mo-
tives behind the state law may have been to do good. But...
history indicates that urges to do good have led to the burning of
books and even to the burning of 'witches."'294
Erica Swecker
294. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 274 (Black, J., dissenting).
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